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I Ill' Bar" I· orl ~ 
As for the grenade lobbed in the Conservancy's 
direction, the Court in effect snagged it before detona-
tion and threw it back, declining to exercise jwisdiction, 
since the IRS had taken no action to revoke the 
Conservancy's tax -exempt status. (Note that the Justice 
Department, not the IRS, is responsible for the 
Government's case in the Claims Court) We believe it 
is safe to predict that there will be no further skirmishing 
on this front. 
But on the government's final contention, that 
benefits to the McLennans (other than tax benefits) 
defeated the deduction, the court was unwilling to 
render summary judgment Unable to determine whether 
such alleged benefits were "merely incidental to a 
greater public conservation benefit," the court deter-
mined that the facts underlying the issues of donative 
intent and exclusive conservation purpose "warrant 
further ventilation." At trial, then, the McLennans were 
to bear the burden of proving that those requirements 
were met. 
If you are puzzled about the Government's stance 
in this matter, dear reader, you are in good and substantial 
company. The Claims Court opinion hints that the 
Government intended to assert that the McLennans 
were motivated to preserve property values and achieve, 
by the voluntary easement conveyance, the equivalent 
of zoning restrictions. Preserving property values by 
giving up substantial and valuable elements of owner-
ship (as the court has already determined to have oc-
curred), seems a rather peculiar way to go. And as for 
the achievement of zoning restrictions through an 
easement program, that is the inevitable object and 
purpose of any successful conservation effort which 
uses the conservation easement as a major strategy. 
As to the necessary "exclusive conservation pur-
pose", which the court also required to be "ventilated" 
at trial, we should note that theM cLennan case involves 
the predecessor to the present conservation easement 
statute. But if the Government insists upon a subjecti ve 
application of that requirement, as it would seem it 
intends to do, a decision in its favor would have dire 
implications for interpreting the present conservation 
easement provisions as well. See § 170(h)(1)(C). 
The posture of the Government's case is discourag-
ingly reminiscent of the attitude of Treasury at the time 
the current conservation easement provisions were in 
gestation. It was then the Treasury's profound belief 
that no charitable contribution deduction should obtain 
when a donor, by conveying an easement, advanced his 
ardent desire to see his property preserved in perpetuity. 
Under those circumstances, went the Treasury line, 
there can be no gift at all. Fortunately, Congress opted 
for an objective determination of what constitutes a 
donation in a conservation easement setting. But, as the 
1 
entanglement of the McLennans with our public ser- j 
vants proves, it is often possible to get a second opinion ?: ~ 
after Congressional incentives have inspired socially ....••. 
desirable conduct. About the best that can be said about 
all of this is that it is probably good for us, now and then, 
to confront these fundamental issues. (The McLennans 
went back to court in May; the second decision has not 
yet been reported. We shall keep you posted.) 
McLennan v. U.S., 91-1 USTC ,50,230 (Cl. Ct. 1991). 
Of Unrequited Deductions (and Lost 
Hopes) 
by William T. Hutton 
The Back Forty Chutzpah Award, bestowed at ir- \ t) .... )' .I., ..
regular intervals for breathtaking aspirations in income .' .~ 
tax planning, goes this month to Grover and Mary Hope ; 
of Dallas, Texas. In 1984, the Hopes, dissatisfied with 
an administrative condemnation award attributable to : 
the taking of their property for an extension of the Dallas 
North Tollway, decided to go to court. ", 
In 1986, by judicial decree, their initial award of 
$607,396 was amplified by an additional $1,650,137. . ..... 
Happy ending? Might well have been, but for the fact 
that, against this discordant theme of condemnation and 
confrontation, the taxpayers heard a sweeter melody, ~ 
the clinking of tax benefits. (Like a dog whistle, it may ~ 
not have been audible to all listening ears.) ~ 
Specifically, the taxpayers alleged that they had %; 
made a charitable contribution to the Texas Turnpike ~ 
Authority in the form of a bargain sale. Pursuant to their ~ 
own $4,038,623 estimate of value for the condemned ..... ~ 
property, they claimed a charitable contribution of ,I 
$1,781,089 (the approximate difference between the 
property's alleged fair market value and the total con- :, 
demnation award). Not surprisingly, the IRS took 
exception to this treatment, disallowed the charitable 
deductions, which spanned three taxable years, and 
asserted liabilities for additional taxes, penalties, and 
interest of over $1.4 million. The Hopes paid the 
assessed deficiencies, filed refund claims, and, upon 










The B~u:k Fort\ / . 
It has been our belief that a charitable contribution 
could indeed be effected in the contex t of a condemnation 
proceeding. See Herbert O. Robinson, 33 T.C.M. 1140 
(1974 ) (charitable deduction denied, but on finding that 
the value of the property did not exceed the condemna-
tion award). If, for example, a landowner, aware of a 
legitimate threat of condemnation but prior to the insti-
gation of proceedings, conveys the subject property to 
a land trust, there would seem to be no inherent llKun 
sistency between the assertion of a charitable contribution 
deduction and the reinvestment of the bargain sale 
proceeds in qualifying replacement property (see IRC 
§ 1033). The amount of the charitable contribution 
would of course be subject to examination, as in any 
bargain sale case. 
The claims court decision in Hope, rendered upon 
motion for summary jUdgment, was a complete victory 
for the Government, and forces us to reexamine our 
thinking about the condemnation/bargain sale transac-
tion. The court was of "the opinion that a charitable 
contribution tax deduction should not be based on a 
completed condemnation proceeding, in which the state 
takes the land for a legitimate public purpose, and the 
landowner receives compensation .... " The opinion 
seems grounded upon the finding that "just" compen-
sation, as determined by the condemnation proceeding, 
firmly establishes the value of the property, leaving no 
room for the assertion of any bargain element. Thus, 
"once Grover Hope agreed to and was paid the compen-
sation, he retained no further rights in the property." Or, 
to put it slightly differently, once Grover had settled 
with tile state, the property's value was established for 
all collateral purposes. Thus interpreted, Grover Hope's 
travail ought not to be read as precluding the estab-
lishment of a charitable deduction on the transfer of 
property subject to threat of condemnation, so long as 
there has been no adjudication of property value in the 
state courts. 
Whether or not other courts accept the Claims 
Court's categorical rule (no room for charitable deduction 
once adjudication has established the property's value), 
it is likely to prove exceedingly difficult to establish that 
a gift was intended once the taxpayer and the condemning 
authority have locked horns on the valuation issue. 
Message: Assess the contribution strategy as soon as 
awareness of the threat of condemnation arises, and 
involve a private charitable organization, the better to 
bolster evidence of "disinterested generosity". 
Hope v. U.S., U.S. Claims Court, 91 TNT 180-11 
(August 28, 1991). 
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Facade Easements and Rehab Credits: 
The Code Giveth and The Code Taketh 
Away 
According to a recent Tax Court opinion, the grant 
of a facade easement intended to protect an historic 
property constitutes a partial disposition of the rehabili-
tated property for purposes of the recapture provisions 
of Internal Revenue Code Section 47. The decision 
endorses a prior administrative position; Revenue Ruling 
89-90, 1989-2 C.B.3. 
Rome I, Ltd. (Rome), a limited partnership formed 
to acquire, rehabilitate and operate commercial prop-
erty in Rome, Georgia, brought the suit when the IRS 
granted Rome only part of a 25% rehab tax credit Rome 
had claimed for restoring a historic building in its 
community. Within the same tax year, the partnership 
had deeded a facade and conservation easement to the 
Georgia Trust for Historic Preservation. 
Though the IRS concluded that the easement was a 
"qualified conservation contribution" under section 
170(h), it maintained that the donation constituted a 
partial disposition of the underlying real property. That 
disposition, the court held, required Rome to recapture 
a portion of the rehab tax credit. (S ince the rehabilitation 
and contribution occurred in the same year, that "re-
capture" was effected by simply reducing the basis of 
the property with respect to which the rehab credit was 
computed.) 
The case turned on the court's construction of 
the term "disposition," interpreted as "transfer(ing) or 
otherwise relinquish(ing) ownership of property." 
Requiring recapture, the court concluded, gave effect 
to Congress' intent to deny double benefits (i.e., 
rehab credit and charitable contribution attributable to 
the same expenditures). 
The decision is consistent in principle with 
another, analogous IRS position as to easements on 
land subject to special-use (usually, farmland) 
valuation for estate tax purposes under section 
2032A. In Letter Ruling 8731001 (March 19,1987), 
the Service held that the sale of an agricultural 
conservation easement with respect to such land will 
be treated as a disposition per §2032A(c)(I)(A), 
causing imposition of additional estate tax. (After 
Rome, the Service would presumably take the same 
view as to a donated easement) 
Rome I, Ltd., 96 T.C. 697 (May 2, 1991) 
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